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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the Supreme Court has continuously reiterated
the importance of the right to marry, finding it to be a fundamental
right protected by the Constitution. Activists across the nation have
celebrated the Court’s continued protection of this fundamental right
as it has expanded the rights of same-sex couples. What has received
somewhat less attention is how the Court’s right-to-marry doctrine has
affected a different segment of the population—prisoners. In the
United States, there are currently 2.2 million people serving time in
our nation’s prisons or jails.1 For many of us, prisoners are people we
would rather not think about. These are individuals who have violated
the laws of our society. However, these individuals have rights
protected by the Constitution and that we cannot ignore.
 J.D. candidate, December 2016, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois
Institute of Technology.
1
THE SENTENCING PROJECT RESEARCH AND ADVOCACY FOR REFORM,
INCARCERATION, http://www.sentencingproject.org/template/page.cfm?id=107 (last
visited Jan. 18, 2016).
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In its landmark decision in Obergefell v. Hodges,2 the Supreme
Court held that the right to marry is fundamental and includes the right
to choose one’s spouse, even if that spouse is of the same sex.3 In
Riker v. Lemmon,4 the Seventh Circuit recently faced a related
question: does the right to marry—and choose one’s spouse—apply to
prisoners?5 In a case dealing with factual circumstances that could be
right out of the hit television show “Orange is the New Black,”6 the
Seventh Circuit considered whether the right to marry, specifically the
freedom to select a spouse, applies even to prisoners.7 The Seventh
Circuit also examined the proper standard for reviewing any
government policy that infringes on this fundamental right to marry.8
Riker v. Lemmon involves a former prison employee who became
romantically involved with a prisoner while employed at the prison.9
The former employee quit her job after their romantic relationship was
discovered, but she continued to correspond with the prisoner through
letters and phone calls.10 The former employee later applied to be
placed on the prisoner’s visitation list, but she was denied on the basis
that prison policy forbids former employees from visiting prisoners at
facilities where they worked if they began a relationship during their
employment.11 The prisoner then submitted an application to marry the
former employee, which was denied by the prison’s chaplain.12 The
former employee filed suit in the United States District Court for the
2

135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
Id. at 2598–99.
4
798 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2015).
5
Id. at 555–56.
6
“Orange is the New Black” is a popular Netflix original series chronicling the
lives of women as they serve sentences in a federal prison. See IMDB, ORANGE IS
THE NEW BLACK, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt2372162/ (last visited Dec. 6, 2015).
7
Riker, 798 F.3d at 555–56.
8
Id. at 551–54.
9
Id. at 548.
10
Id. at 548–49.
11
Id. at 549.
12
Id.
3
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Southern District of Indiana, alleging that the denial of the marriage
application was an unreasonable burden on her right to marry.13
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
prison, concluding that the burden on Ms. Riker’s right to marry was
not substantial.14 The district court emphasized the fact that Ms. Riker
was still free to marry a large portion of the population and was only
prohibited from marrying Mr. Vest.15 In addition, the district court
stressed that allowing Ms. Riker to visit inmates could pose a
legitimate security risk as she was trained in Indiana Department of
Corrections (IDOC) security protocols, and the court would not second
guess the IDOC’s security concerns.16
In reversing the district court’s ruling, the Seventh Circuit held
that the right to marry includes the right to choose one’s spouse, even
in prison, and thus, the prison’s denial of the former employee’s
application to marry was an unreasonable burden on that right.17
THE RIGHT TO MARRY AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
The Supreme Court has held certain liberties to be so important
that they are deemed “fundamental rights,” which the government
cannot infringe unless the high strict scrutiny standard is met.18 In
order to meet the strict scrutiny standard, the government must
demonstrate that its action is necessary to achieve a compelling
purpose.19

13

Id. at 550.
Riker v. Lemmon, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103558, at *21 (S.D. Ind. July 30,
2014), rev’d, 798 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2015).
15
Id. at *22.
16
Id. at *22–23.
17
Riker, 798 F.3d at 549–50.
18
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 812
(Vicki Been et al., eds., 4th ed. 2011).
19
Id.
14
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A. Cases Defining the Right to Marry
The Supreme Court recognized the right to marry as a
fundamental right for the first time in Loving v. Virginia.20 In Loving,
the Court struck down as unconstitutional a Virginia statute that
prohibited a white person from marrying a person of any other race.21
The Plaintiffs in the case were the Lovings, an interracial couple who
were prosecuted for violating the statute.22 The Court held that the
Virginia statute deprived the Lovings of their “constitutionally
protected liberty without due process of law.”23 The Court avowed,
“The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital
personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men. Marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to
our very existence and survival.”24 The Court concluded that “[t]o
deny this fundamental freedom . . . is surely to deprive all the State’s
citizens of liberty without due process of law.”25
The Supreme Court again visited the issue of the right to marry in
Zablocki v. Redhail.26 Zablocki involved a Wisconsin statute which
prevented individuals from marrying if they were behind on their child
support payments.27 These individuals were required to obtain a court
order granting permission to marry.28 A court order would be granted
only if the individual could show proof that he or she had complied
with their child support obligations.29 In Zablocki, the Court
reaffirmed the right to marry as a fundamental right.30 While the Court
20

388 U.S. 1 (1967).
Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 818.
22
Id. at 818.
23
Id. at 819.
24
Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
25
Id.
26
434 U.S. 374 (1978).
27
Id. at 375.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 386.
21

39
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accepted that the state had a substantial interest in ensuring child
support payments were paid, the Court found the law was not a
sufficient means to accomplish that end.31 Thus, the statute violated
the equal protection clause.32
The Supreme Court most recently addressed the fundamental right
to marry in Obergefell v. Hodges.33 In Obergefell, the petitioners
challenged state laws in Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee
that defined marriage as between a man and a woman.34 The
petitioners argued that these laws violated their constitutional right to
marry.35 Relying on precedents including Loving and Zablocki, the
Court stated that it had “long held the right to marry is protected by the
Constitution.”36 The Court then concluded that same-sex couples must
be able to exercise the right to marry.37
B. The Right to Marry in Prison
The Supreme Court directly addressed the issue of marriage in the
prison context in Turner v. Safley.38 In Turner, prisoners challenged a
marriage regulation that permitted them to marry only with permission
from the prison superintendent.39 The superintendent would approve
marriages only for compelling reasons.40 The Court emphasized the
need “to formulate a standard of review for prisoners’ constitutional
claims that is responsive both to the ‘policy of judicial restraint
regarding prisoner complaints and [to] the need to protect

31

Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 820.
Id.
33
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
34
Id. at 2593.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 2598.
37
Id.
38
482 U.S. 78 (1987).
39
Id. at 82.
40
Id.
32

40
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constitutional rights.’”41 The standard articulated by the Court in
Turner was “whether a prison regulation that burdens a fundamental
right is reasonably related to legitimate penological objectives.”42 The
court in Turner identified four factors to be considered in determining
the reasonableness of a prison regulation restricting the right to marry:
(1) whether a valid, rational connection exists between the
regulation and a legitimate government interest behind the
rule; (2) whether there are alternative means of exercising the
right in question; (3) what impact accommodation of the
asserted constitutional right would have on guards, other
inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources; and (4)
what easy alternatives exist to the regulation because,
although the regulation need not satisfy a least restrictive
alternatives test, the existence of obvious alternatives may be
evidence that the regulation is not reasonable.43
DISTRICT COURT DECISION OF RIKER V. LEMMON
A. Factual Background
Rebecca Riker was employed by Aramark Correctional Services,
Inc. (Aramark) from December 2007 until April 2008.44 As a
contractor with the Indiana Department of Corrections (IDOC or the
Department), Aramark was required to abide by IDOC’s policies and
procedures.45 Ms. Riker worked at the Wabash Valley Correctional
Facility, a prison facility that Aramark operated.46 The Wabash Valley
Correctional Facility (WVCF) is a level-four maximum-security
41

Id. at 85 (alteration in the original).
Id. at 87 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
43
Id.
44
Riker v. Lemmon, 798 F.3d 546, 552 (7th Cir. 2015).
45
Riker v. Lemmon, No. 1:13-cv-00571-TWP-DML, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
103558, at *3 (S.D. Ind. July 30, 2014).
46
Riker, 798 F.3d at 552.
42

41
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correctional facility located in Carlisle, Indiana.47 Ms. Riker worked as
a kitchen supervisor.48 In that capacity, she supervised roughly twenty
inmates in preparing and serving meals.49 As a part of her job training,
IDOC instructed Ms. Riker in “security, first aid, and personal
protection skills.”50 In addition, she received “training on WVCF
emergency security procedures, including procedures for evacuation,
riots, bomb threats, escape prevention, security sweeps, hostage
scenarios, and emergency transport.”51
Ms. Riker met Paul Vest while working as his supervisor.52 Mr.
Vest is an IDOC inmate serving a fifty-year sentence for robbery;53 his
projected parole date is December 18, 2030.54 Mr. Vest and Ms. Riker
began a romantic and physical relationship a few months after she
started working at the prison.55 On multiple occasions, Mr. Vest and
Ms. Riker kissed and had sexual intercourse in a walk-in cooler in the
kitchen area.56 One day, a co-worker witnessed the two kissing and
informed Ms. Riker that she had to report her.57 Ms. Riker left work
that day and did not return to her employment at the prison.58
After Ms. Riker left her job at the prison in April 2008 she
continued to maintain contact with Mr. Vest.59 In May of 2008, she
submitted an application to be placed on Mr. Vest’s visitor list.60 Her
application was denied because she had previously worked at the
47

Id.
Riker, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103558, at *3.
49
Riker, 798 F.3d at 552.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Riker, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103558, at *5–6.
53
Id. at *3.
54
Id.
55
Id. at *6.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Riker v. Lemmon, 798 F.3d 546, 550 (7th Cir. 2015).
60
Id.
48

42
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facility.61 In 2008 and 2009, Ms. Riker wrote letters to prison officials,
again requesting that she be placed on Mr. Vest’s visitor list.62 In
support of her request, Ms. Riker pointed out that while she had
worked at the facility, she was an employee of Aramark, a contractor.63
Prison officials responded that prison policy prohibited former
employees from visiting prisoners at the facility where they were
previously employed.64 Ms. Riker was also informed of the appeal
process for the denial of her application.65 In 2009, Mr. Vest submitted
a request to marry Ms. Riker through the Religious Service
Department.66 The prison chaplain denied Mr. Vest’s request because
“Ms. Riker was not on Mr. Vest’s approved visitation list.”67
Thereafter, Ms. Riker submitted multiple additional applications to
visit Mr. Vest, which were also denied.68
B. The District Court’s Ruling
In April 2013, Ms. Riker filed suit in the Southern District of
Indiana against IDOC officials based on the denials of her requests to
visit and marry Mr. Vest.69 The IDOC officials, in turn, moved for
summary judgment arguing that “the Department’s refusal to permit
Ms. Riker to marry Vest did not violate [Ms.] Riker’s qualified
constitutional right to marry.”70
The district court noted that Ms. Riker brought two causes of
action based on the First Amendment.71 The first cause of action,
61

Id.
Id.
63
Riker, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103558, at *6.
64
Id. at *7.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id at *7–8.
69
Riker v. Lemmon, 798 F.3d 546, 550 (7th Cir. 2015).
70
Id. at 551 (alteration in the original) (internal quotations omitted).
71
Riker, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103558, at *17.
62

43
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Count I, was based on Ms. Riker’s right to associate with a prisoner—
Mr. Vest.72 The district court found that Ms. Riker’s complaint and
summary judgment briefings failed to demonstrate any First
Amendment expression that the Defendants had in some way
limited.73 The second cause of action, Count II, was based on Ms.
Riker’s right to an intimate association with Mr. Vest through
marriage, which she asserted was based on the First Amendment.74
However, as the district court noted, the right to form an intimate
relationship is not analyzed under the First Amendment.75 The right to
form an intimate relationship, such as marriage, is analyzed as a
liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, which Ms. Riker alleged
in Count III.76
In analyzing Ms. Riker’s right to marry claim, the district court
relied on the standard articulated in Zablocki.77 The Zablocki standard
requires a two part inquiry: “if the challenged policy imposes a direct
and substantial burden on an intimate relationship, it is subject to strict
scrutiny; if the policy does not impose a direct and substantial burden,
it is subject only to rational basis review.”78 Here, the district court
found “that the burden on Ms. Riker’s right to marry was not
substantial or direct,” but was moderate at best.79 In reaching this
conclusion, the court relied on the fact that Ms. Riker herself had not
made a formal request to marry Mr. Vest.80 The court also relied on a
Sixth Circuit case that defined a direct and substantial burden as one
where either a large percentage of the individuals affected “are
absolutely or largely prevented from marrying” or the individuals
72

Id.
Id. at *18.
74
Id.
75
Id. at *19.
76
Id.
77
Id. at *19–20.
78
Id. at *20 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383–87 (1978);
Montgomery v. Stefaniak, 410 F.3d 933, 938 (7th Cir. 2005)).
79
Id. at *21.
80
Id.
73

44

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2015

9

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 3

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 11, Issue 1

Fall 2015

affected “are absolutely or largely prevented from marrying a large
portion of the otherwise eligible population of spouses.”81 The court
concluded that the burden on Ms. Riker’s right to marry was not
substantial because she was not prevented from marrying a large
portion of the eligible population of potential spouses.82 Thus, the
district court applied only a rational basis standard of review in
analyzing the IDOC’s policies at issue in this case.83
Applying rational basis review, the district court first noted that
the Defendants’ argued “legitimate penological interests” supported
the policies.84 The IDOC argued that since Ms. Riker was trained in its
security protocols, allowing her, or any other former employee, to visit
an inmate would create “legitimate security risks.”85 In addition, the
IDOC also argued that Ms. Riker had already violated prison policies
by engaging in a sexual relationship with an inmate while employed at
the prison.86 The court found these rationales sufficient to pass rational
basis review, and refused to “second guess the security concerns
expressed by the correctional authorities.”87 Based on the foregoing,
the district court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment.88
Ms. Riker appealed the lower court’s decision.89 Ms. Riker’s
appeal related only to “the district court’s decision that the defendants
did not unreasonably burden her constitutional right to marry.”90

81

Id. at *22–23 (citing Akers v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 1030, 1040 (6th Cir.

2003)).
82

Id. at *22.
Id. at *23.
84
Id. at *22.
85
Id. at *22–23.
86
Id. at *23.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
See Riker v. Lemmon, 798 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2015).
90
Id. at 550.
83

45
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THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S OPINION IN RIKER V. LEMMON
A. Prior Seventh Circuit Cases Involving the Right to
Marry in Prison
The Seventh Circuit has previously addressed the issue of the
right to marry in the prison context in Keeney v. Heath91 and Martin v.
Snyder.92
In Keeney, the plaintiff was a guard at the prison who became
acquainted with one of the prisoners.93 A supervisor at the jail became
suspicious that the two were romantically involved and had the
prisoner transferred to a different facility.94 The two began a
correspondence, and the guard began to frequently visit the prisoner.95
The supervisor who had transferred the prisoner asked the guard about
her relationship with the prisoner.96 The guard admitted that she was in
a relationship with the prisoner and planned to marry him.97 The
supervisor told the guard that she either had to stop her relationship
with the prisoner or quit her job because of a prison regulation that
prohibited employees from being socially involved with prisoners
either inside or outside of the prison.98 The guard resigned from her
position and married the prisoner the following year.99 The guard filed
suit alleging that the defendants violated her constitutional right to
marry by forcing her to choose between her job and marrying the man

91

57 F.3d 579 (7th Cir. 1995).
329 F.3d 919 (7th Cir. 2003)
93
Keeney, 57 F.3d at 580.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
92

46
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of her choice.100 The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of the prison and the plaintiff appealed.101
The Seventh Circuit noted that while the defendants did not
outright forbid the plaintiff from marrying the prisoner, they made it
costly for her to do so, which was undoubtedly a burden on her right to
marry.102 Thus, the court stated that the defendants could impose such
a burden, but only if they articulated some justification for doing so.103
The court emphasized that this justification need not be as strong as if
they were forbidding marriage as in the Turner case.104 In its opinion,
the court stressed that “[j]udges should be cautious about disparaging
disciplinary and security concerns expressed by the correctional
authorities.”105 Therefore, courts should not interfere “[a]s long as the
concerns expressed by correctional authorities are plausible, and the
burden that a challenged regulation of jail or prison security places on
protected rights a light or moderate one.”106 In Keeney, the court found
that the burden on the right to marry was not substantial, but light or
moderate at most, and thus, the prison did not violate the plaintiff’s
constitutional right to marry.107
The Seventh Circuit once again confronted the issue of how the
fundamental right to marry applies in the prison context in Martin v.
Snyder.108 In Martin, the prisoner’s visitation privileges were
suspended for thirty days after an incident where the prisoner touched
his girlfriend’s buttock during a visit at the prison.109 The prisoner’s
girlfriend was also placed on a restricted list for an unspecified period

100

Id.
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 580–81.
105
Id. at 581.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
329 F.3d 919 (7th Cir. 2003).
109
Id. at 920.
101

47
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of time.110 Around six months or so later, the prisoner and his
girlfriend requested permission to marry from the warden.111 Their
request was denied because the prisoner’s girlfriend was not, at that
time, permitted to visit the prisoner.112 They filed suit alleging that the
prison violated their constitutional right to marry by preventing the
couple from being able to see and marry each other.113 The district
court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim, concluding that
although prisoners have a fundamental right to marry, prisons can
restrict this right if there are valid penological reasons for doing so.114
The court held that violating a prison rule was an acceptable
justification for barring a marriage.115
In upholding the district court’s decision, the Seventh Circuit
emphasized that while the complaint alleged the couple was denied the
ability to marry, the warden did not prevent their marriage, he merely
postponed it.116 Therefore, the court held that “[r]estrictions on
visitation, though not enough to justify prohibiting marriage, may well
justify deferment, so that the sanction for misconduct will have some
sting.”117
B. The Seventh’s Circuit Opinion in Riker v. Lemmon
In Riker v. Lemmon, the Seventh Circuit once again addressed the
complexities in analyzing the application of the fundamental right to
marry in prisons.118 In an opinion authored by Judge Ripple, the court
began by stressing that “courts must take cognizance of the valid
constitutional claims of prison inmates” because “[p]rison walls do not
110

Id.
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 921–22.
117
Id. at 922.
118
798 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2015).
111

48
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form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the
Constitution.”119 The court also noted that while a prisoner’s
fundamental right to marry is protected by the Constitution, this right
is subject to considerable restrictions.120 The court then articulated the
standard set forth in Turner for analyzing constitutional claims by
prisoners, “a prison regulation [that] impinges on inmates’
constitutional rights . . . is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests.”121 To determine whether a regulation is
reasonable, the court must “balance the constitutional right asserted
against the legitimate penological goals of the prison.”122 Although
Ms. Riker is not a prisoner, the standard is the same for all challenges
to prison regulations as violating constitutional rights whether the
rights of prisoners or non-prisoners are at issue.123 The court then
reiterated the four factors articulated in Turner for determining if a
prison regulation that restricts the right to marry is reasonable: (1)
whether there is a valid, rational connection between the regulation
and a legitimate government interest, (2) whether any alternative
means of exercising the right are available, (3) what impact
accommodating the right would have, (4) the existence of easy
alternatives to the regulation.124
ANALYSIS
A.

The Seventh Circuit Correctly Found That the Fundamental
Right to Marry Includes the Right to Select One’s Spouse, Even
in Prison

The IDOC argued that its denial of Ms. Riker’s marriage
application did not infringe on Ms. Ricker’s right to marry because she
119

Id. at 551 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987).
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id. at 552.
123
Id.
124
Id.
120

49
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was free to marry anyone but Mr. Vest.125 The district court agreed
with the Department, finding that the burden on Ms. Ricker’s right to
marry was not substantial or direct because she had not been prevented
from marrying a large portion of the population.126 However, as the
Seventh Circuit was quick to note, this argument can be readily
dismissed.127 Relying on the Supreme Court’s holding in Obergefell,
the Seventh Circuit found, “the right to marry includes the right to
select one’s spouse.”128 In Obergefell, the Court held that the right to
marry is fundamental, and “the right to personal choice regarding
marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy.”129
Although “[p]rison walls do not form a barrier separating prison
inmates from the protections of the Constitution,”130 they are subject
to substantial restrictions.131 However, as the Seventh Circuit noted,
the district court’s analysis should have focused on whether the prison
regulation prevented Ms. Riker from marrying Mr. Vest was an
unreasonable burden. The district court’s analysis should not have
considered whether Ms. Riker was free to marry other members of
society.
B. The Seventh Circuit Failed to Properly Acknowledge the IDOC’s
Security-Related Justifications and Should Have Focused on the
Existence of Alternatives to the Regulation
The Seventh Circuit failed to adequately acknowledge the IDOC’s
security related justifications for the regulation, and the court should
not have cast aside these concerns so readily. The IDOC also argued
that its decision to deny Ms. Riker’s request to marry Mr. Vest was in
125

Id. at *20.
Riker v. Lemmon, No. 1:13-cv-00571-TWP-DML, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
103558, at *21 (S.D. Ind. July 30, 2014).
127
Riker, 798 F.3d at 555-56.
128
Id.
129
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015).
130
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987).
131
Id. at 95.
126

50
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furtherance of its “legitimate interest in maintaining security and
institutional order.”132 In support of this argument, the Department
provided two “security-related justifications” for its decision.133 First,
the Department maintained that former employees previously found to
have violated Department policies are “more likely to engage in other
prohibited acts.”134 Ms. Riker had already violated IDOC policies by
beginning a relationship with a prisoner while employed at the
prison.135 The risks associated with the tendency for individuals to
take drastic actions on behalf of someone they love can be catastrophic
in the prison environment. The massive manhunt that occurred during
the summer of 2015, after two inmates escaped with help from a
prison employee, who was involved in a relationship with one of the
inmates, demonstrates the serious consequences of inappropriate
relationships between prison employees and prisoners.136 Second, the
Department argued that a former employee could share confidential
information obtained during their employment at the prison with an
inmate.137 Concerns regarding a prison employee, or former employee,
sharing confidential information with an inmate are heightened if the
individuals are, or become, married because the marital
communications privilege protects confidential communications
between spouses from compelled disclosure.138 In evaluating the
IDOC’s security-related justifications for its regulation, the Seventh
Circuit considered whether the Department’s decision to prevent Ms.
Ricker from marrying Mr. Vest “was reasonably related to its
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legitimate penological interests.”139 The Department’s security-related
justifications should not be hastily dismissed.
The Seventh Circuit concluded that because Ms. Riker is only
seeking a one-time visit to the prison, the burden on her fundamental
right to marry is significant and unconstitutional.140 Ignoring the
factual record from the district court proceedings, the Seventh Circuit
criticized the Department’s position as equating “Ms. Riker’s one-time
request to enter the prison to participate in a marriage ceremony with a
request for general visitation rights.”141 The court simply cast aside the
Department’s contention that “the same security principles and
concerns apply to the consideration of [Ms.] Riker’s request for
marriage as it does her request for visitation.”142 The IDOC relied on
the same security related justifications in defending both its visitation
and marriage policies.143 Although on appeal Ms. Riker argued that
she sought only a single visit to the prison for the sole purpose of
marrying her fiancé,144 the record below does not support Ms. Riker’s
contention that her request was so limited. On the contrary, the record
below indicated that Ms. Riker submitted multiple requests to be
placed on Mr. Vest’s visitor’s list.145 The Seventh Circuit relied on
Martin v. Snyder,146 another case in which the Court considered the
right to marry in the prison context.147 In Martin, the prison’s
visitation privileges were revoked after he fondled his girlfriend
during a visit at the prison.148 While the prisoner’s girlfriend was still
on his restricted visitation list, the prisoner requested permission to
139
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marry her.149 The request was denied because the prisoner’s girlfriend
was not allowed to visit the prisoner.150 Relying on Martin, the
Seventh Circuit concluded, “a prison’s visitation policy, on its own,
does not justify prohibiting an inmate’s marriage.”151 However, the
Department did not rely solely on its visitation policy in denying Ms.
Riker’s request for marriage. IDOC policies clearly indicate that a
request for marriage may be denied because “[t]he offender is
requesting to marry either a staff member or former staff member of
the department,” or “[t]he requested marriage would endanger the
safety and security of the facility, the department, the individuals or
the public.”152 Although the court emphasized that the denials of Ms.
Riker’s marriage applications did not reference the Department’s
marriage policy,153 the Department argued that the same security
justifications support both its visitation and marriage policies.154
The Department cited specific security concerns that would result
if a former employee were allowed to visit an inmate with whom they
developed an inappropriate relationship during their employment.155
Ms. Riker was “trained by the [IDOC] in security protocols, defense,
and emergency security procedures” and might divulge such
information to Mr. Vest “or assist him in other inappropriate ways.”156
The Department also maintained that prohibiting Ms. Riker’s marriage
served as a deterrent to other employees.157 It is this kind of secondguessing by courts of policies implemented by prison administrators
that previous precedents cautioned against. The Seventh Circuit “must
accord substantial deference to the professional judgment of prison
administrators, who bear a significant responsibility for defining the
149
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Riker, 798 F.3d at 557.
152
Id. at 550 n.11.
153
Id. at 550–51.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id. at 557.
150

53

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol11/iss1/3

18

Wright: The Seventh Circuit Finds the Fundamental Right to Marry Includes

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 11, Issue 1

Fall 2015

legitimate goals of a corrections system and for determining the most
appropriate means to accomplish them.”158 A statement by the Seventh
Circuit that the prison officials did not demonstrate that they used their
professional judgment in denying Ms. Riker’s marriage request is not
sufficient.159 It is unclear how the court could possibly come to the
conclusion that the prison officials did not use their professional
judgment in drafting and implementing the policies relating to the
visitation and marriage of formers employees to inmates at the prison.
The Seventh Circuit relied almost entirely on the first factor of the
Turner test in reaching its conclusion. Near the end of its conclusion,
the court once again missed the point by emphasizing that “the record
does not reveal why prison officials would have difficulty monitoring
the marriage ceremony to ensure that Ms. Riker does not violate prison
regulations or relay sensitive information to Vest.”160 The record does
not reveal such difficulties because Ms. Riker raised this argument—
that she seeks only a short marriage ceremony—for the first time on
appeal. If the Department were to consider Ms. Riker’s request as a
general request for the marriage, and all its benefits including
visitations, a lengthier discussion regarding the other factors in the
Turner test would be necessary. The second factor in the Turner
standard is “whether there are alternative means of exercising the right
that remain open to prison inmates.”161 Here, there are no alternative
means available for Ms. Riker and Mr. Vest to exercise their right to
marry.
The third factor is “the impact accommodation of the asserted
constitutional right would have on guards, other inmates, and on
allocation of prison resources generally.”162 The Seventh Circuit
briefly addressed this factor, but focused its discussion solely on the
impact of allowing Ms. Riker and Mr. Vest to have a brief one-time
158
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marriage ceremony at the prison.163 In its discussion, the court noted
“the record does not reveal why prison officials would have difficulty
monitoring the marriage ceremony to ensure that Ms. Riker does not
violate prison regulations or relay sensitive information to Vest.”164
However, as noted supra, the Seventh Circuit’s reliance on Ms.
Riker’s contention that she seeks only a brief one-time visit to the
prison for the purpose of holding a marriage ceremony is misplaced.
Ms. Riker did not make such a limited argument in her case before the
district court below,165 and ignored the possibility that Ms. Riker and
Mr. Vest would seek other marital benefits after the marriage
ceremony. Thus, it is necessary to consider the impact of
accommodating Ms. Riker’s general request to marry Mr. Vest, and the
accompanying martial benefits—including visitation. Accommodating
Ms. Riker’s general request for marriage would have a greater impact
on the guards, other inmates, and prison resources. Allowing Ms.
Riker, a former employee of the prison who has knowledge of the
IDOC’s security protocols, to marry Vest could endanger the prison’s
guards and make it more difficult for them to maintain security and
order in the prison. Granting Ms. Riker’s request to marry Vest could
also impact the other inmates housed at the facility, and it might lead
other inmates to attempt to engage in inappropriate relationships with
prison staff.
Finally, the last factor in the Turner standard is the existence, or
absence, of easy alternatives to the regulation at issue.166 The Court in
Turner found that “if an inmate claimant can point to an alternative
that fully accommodates the prisoner’s rights at de minimis cost to
valid penological interests, a court may consider that as evidence that
the regulation does not satisfy the reasonable relationship standard.”167
The Seventh Circuit briefly addressed this issue as well, but once
163
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again relied on Ms. Riker’s insistence that she sought only a brief
marriage ceremony.168 The court stated that the IDOC offered no
justification for why it could not grant Ms. Riker’s marriage request
while still maintaining the security of its facility.169 Therefore, the
court found it implausible “that a brief marriage ceremony [could not]
be accommodated without threatening institutional security and
without imposing more than a de minimis impact on prison
resources.”170 However, once again, the Seventh Circuit’s
determination that Ms. Riker sought to return to the prison only to
participate in a brief marriage ceremony is erroneous. The court’s
analysis should have focused on whether there were easy alternatives
to the IDOC’s regulation that prohibited former employees from
marrying—or visiting—inmates housed at the same facility.
The fact that easy alternatives exist that would allow Ms. Riker to
marry Mr. Vest demonstrates that the IDOC’s regulation is not
reasonable. Here, although the IDOC’s regulation prohibiting former
employees from engaging in relationships with prisoners at the same
facility where they are employed serves a valid penological interest,
the IDOC could allow for individuals who may become involved in
these relationships to transfer facilities in order to alleviate any
security related concerns. The IDOC could have transferred Mr. Vest
to a different prison facility in order to allow Ms. Riker and Mr. Vest
to become married. Transferring Mr. Vest to a different facility would
alleviate any security related concerns because Ms. Riker would not
have the same level of knowledge regarding the procedures at a
different facility. Moreover, the transfer of prisons occurs quite
frequently and would result is de minimis cost for the prison.
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CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit’s holding requires the prison to show more
than is required under the standard articulated in Turner.171 Indeed,
according to Turner, there must be a valid, rational connection
between the regulation and a legitimate government interest behind the
rule.172 The prison has maintained rational security concerns related to
Ms. Riker’s requests for visitation and marriage. However, the prison
has an alternative means of allowing Ms. Riker to exercise her right to
marry while at the same time protecting the security interest of the
prison. The prison could transfer Mr. Vest to another prison facility
where Ms. Riker was never employed, which would alleviate any
security related concerns while still allowing Ms. Riker to exercise her
right to marry the spouse of her choosing.
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